Nothing new from "Der Spiegel"
Article on Asse mine based on half-truths and a rather biased view
On closer inspection, the information on the Asse mine published in the 44th edition of the news magazine "Der Spiegel" is of little relevance only. In its key message, the magazine focussed unilaterally on statements of citizens initiatives, although the Federal Office for Radiation Protection had answered in detail questions posed by “Der Spiegel” in September. The very little relevance of the article may also have been the reason why it took nearly two months to publish it. Basically, the BfS welcomes the attention paid to the Asse mine in the reporting. However, it would be more helpful if the actual problems were identified. In the following, the BfS comments on the specific claims. Given that some facts were mentioned leaving out important information, the BfS also publishes the answers it had given to "Der Spiegel" when it did its research.
Claim 1: The BfS and other authorities involved would hinder the retrieval of the wastes through slow action.
Since 2009, the BfS has been the responsible operator of the Asse mine. The central task is to decommission the Asse mine in such a way that the legal limit values for man and environment will be kept both today and for future generations. According to the current state of knowledge this can only be ensured by retrieving the wastes. Retrieving the wastes was and is not an end in itself. It is technically demanded. This situation has not changed. Keeping in mind the bad state of the mine, which was not caused by the BfS, this task is ambitious.
To substantiate the claim that the BfS pursued the opposite, the article uses in particular statements of a local citizens initiative. As they put it, authorities tried to thwart the recovery of the wastes on purpose through slow action. The article does not name any possible reasons for this alleged motivation.
Claim 2: The view on the Asse budget suggests that the competent authorities do not speed up their action.
The budget is no standard for building progress or regress. Irrespective of this, both the funds available in the budget and the actual costs for the Asse mine have increased in each single year since the BfS took over operation in 2009. More detailed information has already been published by the BfS on the internet:
Data and facts relating to financing the Asse project
Claim 3: The cross-flooding solution that needs to be purchased would be stored in 8,400 railway tank wagons or in 400 inland navigation vessels.
That is not true. Apart from that, the fact is not new that a large volume of cross-flooding solution needs to be purchased for an emergency that cannot be ruled out. The planning as part of the emergency preparedness has been known for a long time and has been communicated by the BfS several times; detailed information was last provided at a citizens initiative briefing on 31 July 2014, cf.:
“Subject: Asse“: BfS informed about the status of work for emergency prepardness
Claim 4: That the BfS suspended the search procedure for an interim storage facility is seen as an indication that retrieval was not wanted or intended. (Quotation of a representative of the local citizens initiative: "If nothing is recovered, there is also no need for an interim storage facility.")
The BfS considers the interim storage facility as a necessary prerequisite for retrieval. For this reason, the debate about interim storage was rapidly driven forward. A solution supported by all parties involved has so far been made difficult by disagreements and changing arguments in the Monitoring Group and in citizens initiatives. That all parties involved want to deal in detail with decisions in this matter, is understandable. The BfS temporarily suspended the procedure for the interim storage facility in the middle of 2014, in order to bring the various opinions on the further approach to a constructive result. The Monitoring Group, too, stated that they agreed with the BfS and supported an evaluation by external experts.
BfS answers to questions by "Der Spiegel" regarding the Asse mine of 4 September 2014
Preliminary note
It does not come as a surprise that the accompanying process is currently in a more difficult phase than it was initially, immediately after the change of operators. It is not the purpose of the debates to uncover incidents of the past but to realise concrete planning, technical tasks part of which also require disagreeable decisions.
Due to its mining supervision, the Federal Office for Radiation Protection must ensure and implement the necessary safety in the mine. We are dealing with a facility that had practically been left to its own devices and was still in an extremely bad state after operators had changed, and it still is in this bad state. Only with the help of the stabilisation and emergency measures can we achieve the necessary safety and thus also a basis that enables retrieval. In the debates that are marked by complex technical details, this principle has often been overlooked and was superimposed by emerging concerns about details. These contradictions – on the one hand, necessary and urgent safety measures and, on the other hand, concerns – have led to the fact that there has been no final opinion regarding the key tasks such as stabilisation, but questions.
Therefore, about one year ago, the BfS initiated a process of communication between all parties involved and made first proposals. The BfS welcomes expressly that the Asse-2 Monitoring Group have accepted the BfS proposals for such a process.
1. Situation fact-finding. When the fact-finding was launched, it was planned to examine in more detail the situation in emplacement chambers 7 and 12 by drillings. What is the current state of the examinations? When are the works expected to be completed?
You will find detailed information on the fact-finding at:
Current status of the trial phase (fact finding)
Important findings of the first drillings were that so far no explosive gases had occurred and the radioactivity levels measured did not question retrieval. The public was informed about this, cf.:
From the point of view of the Federal Office for Radiation Protection, the fact-finding procedure requires too much time in its present form. Currently, re-examination and, if possible, streamlining of the procedure are being discussed.
2. Situation shaft V. When will the final report on the test drilling be presented that was already completed in spring? Is the report a basis for the decision as to whether the current collaring point is suitable for building the shaft?
Both the BfS and the Asse-GmbH inform on their respective homepages about the current status, cf.:
Sinking of a recovery shaft (shaft 5)
Press releases of Asse-GmbH
For the retrieval of the wastes, the future shaft must comply with highest safety requirements, among others requirements under nuclear law.
The recently completed surface examination alone is not sufficient for a safe final evaluation as to whether the collaring point is suitable. As has been planned from the start, a safe evaluation can only be made after further geological examinations have been carried out from inside the mine. These examinations are currently being prepared and will be launched in October.
3. Situation stabilisation measures. In the Monitoring Group it was criticised that different stabilisation measures were carried out on the 750-m level without having presented a drainage concept. Is this criticism correct?
No. In the past, the topic of drainage was often debated with the experts in the Monitoring Group. In August, the BfS presented a written concept summarising the approach in an easily comprehensible way.
In principle: Stabilisation measures performed are mainly measures serving the safety inside the mine and that need to be carried out as closely as possible. The BfS is obliged to do this. The measures are also a component of emergency preparedness and are to ensure for the long term that the mine will remain fit for its intended purpose, in order to make retrieval possible.
4. Situation cross-flooding. Is it true that, for a possible transport of the brine for cross-flooding, the lorry unloading place, part of which has been set up on the track, is to be dismantled in order to restore the rail access?
There has always been a rail access on the premises and it will continue to exist. So there is no need to establish it.
5. Situation 3-D-seismology. In the past it was discussed to examine in more detail the underground of the Asse mine with the help of 3D seismic measurements. What is the status of this project?
Whether this procedure will provide the desired knowledge is currently being examined on the basis of preliminary investigations.
Information on the procedure cf.
3D seismic measurements in the Asse region
6. Situation interim storage facility. Is it true that the BfS opposes the interim storage of the recovered Asse wastes in an interim storage facility not located near the Asse mine? If so: How many and what concrete sites for a possible interim storage facility located not near the Asse mine have so far been taken into account by the BfS?
For technical reasons and in particular for reasons concerning safety and radiation protection, the Federal Office for Radiation Protection has opted for sites near the Asse mine. Where double-transports or the handling of radiation-emitting material can be avoided, this must actually happen, in particular for radiation protection reasons. Currently the BfS has suspended the site selection procedure. First and foremost, the BfS is interested in discussing the work with the Monitoring Group in principle, in order to reach a joint approach for the selection procedure, if possible.
7. Situation monitoring process. What are the BfS considerations regarding a readjustment of the monitoring process? In our phone call you mentioned a letter from BfS president König from last year on this topic. Can you provide me with this letter or give me the reference? In the opinion of several members of the Asse-2 Monitoring Group, the participation process is currently at a “critical stage”. Does the BfS share this view?
I have already sent you the link to the aforementioned letter, cf.:
BfS letter to the Asse-2 Monitoring Group (in German)
As mentioned at the beginning, the monitoring process has changed in the course of the past five years, solely by the long periods of time the procedure takes. That makes demands on all parties involved, in particular the citizens who are actively engaged in voluntary work. Solely because of the periods of time is it basically reasonable to reflect the procedure.
Co-operation has become more critical altogether. The shift in content makes the procedure also more sophisticated. For example, it has shown that regulations are lacking at present as to how decisions can be finalised in a comprehensible way and in correspondence with the respective responsibilities, in the event of diverging views. It is planned to have the monitoring process evaluated by third parties. This plan is broadly supported.